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1 Introduction
We live in a highly food insecure world. Although
global food supplies are more than adequate, the
latest UnitedNations ‘Report on theWorldNutrition
Situation’ estimates that 798 million people were
“undernourished” in 1999–2001, up from 780
million in 1995–97 (UN-SCN 2004: 9). In the 46
poorest countries, per capita food production has
fallen by 10 per cent in the past 20 years (Fischer
et al. 2002: 4). Parts of Africa, especially theHorn,
have historically been acutely famine-prone – and
remain so.HIV/AIDS, civil war and insecurity, and
inadequate government and donor support to
agriculture are all undermining progress towards
the first MillenniumDevelopment Goal, of halving
extremepoverty andhunger by 2015.The questions
that climate change add to this challenging context
are: how will climate change impact on global food
supplies, and how will its impacts be distributed?
Specifically, will climate change increase or reduce
the food security risks facing countries and people
in different parts of the world?
During the 1990s, a number of projections of
world food demand and supplies into the twenty-
first century were made, including studies by the
UN Food and Agricultural Organisation
(Alexandratos 1995), the International Food Policy
Research Institute (Pinstrup-Andersen et al. 1999),
and independent academics (Dyson 1996). The
bottom-line conclusion from these models is that
global food supplies will match or exceed global
food demand for at least the next two to three
decades; but three important caveats should be
noted. First, following rapid yield increases since
the 1950s, production growth is slowing down as
the limits of agricultural intensification appear to
be approaching – though biotechnology might push
back the frontiers. Second, a positive global
“storyline” conceals regional disparities that are
deeply worrying for already food insecure regions:
specifically, food gaps in sub-Saharan Africa are
projected to widen as population growth continues
to exceed production growth, increasing the need
for food imports from surplus producing countries
(Maxwell 2001). Third, these models pay little or
no attention to climate change.
Environmental determinismhas always been an
influential strand of the food security discourse. In
the 1970s, desertification was invoked as amajor
threat to livelihoods in Africa. Apocalyptic
predictions were made – the Sahara was allegedly
advancing by 6 km every year, destroying farmland
and pastures – that, with hindsight, have proved
unfounded (Nicholson 2001). Also in the 1970s,
geographers identified two weather-related “famine
belts”, one located in the cold northern latitudes
fromEurope toChina, the other girdling the tropics,
from theWest African Sahel to India (Cox 1981).
Cold spells in the former, and droughts in the latter,
triggered most famines until relatively recently.
Famines have now disappeared from the “cold belt”
– though a series of harsh winters brought Mongolia
to the brink in 2002 (Siurua and Swift 2002) – but
extreme weather events still trigger many
humanitarian emergencies in the “hot belt”.
Nonetheless, the causes of contemporary food crises
are recognised as far more complex: if climate,
environment and demography received most
analytical attention in the past, nowadays failures
of national policies and global politics dominate
thinking on famine and food insecurity (IDS 2002).
The excessive alarmism of environmental
determinists in the past provides no basis for
dismissing current concerns about climate change
in the future. For one thing, climate modelling is
becomingmore sophisticated, and the projections
for food security in regions that are already
vulnerable to hunger and famine are deeply
worrying. Achieving food security for all is
challenging enough even in the absence of climate
change.On the other hand, not all climate change
is bad change – or more accurately, climate change
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is not necessarily bad for all people.This article will
argue that the food security implications of climate
change need to be carefully disaggregated, and that
effectivemitigation and adaptation depend as much
on political responses as on agricultural
consequences.
2 How will climate change affect
agriculture?
Themost direct implications of climate change for
food security are through its impacts on food
production worldwide. The consensus of scientific
opinion is that countries in temperate and polar
regions will enjoy increased agricultural production,
while countries in tropical and subtropical regions
are likely to suffer agricultural losses. Overall, the
world is expected to gain some 9 per cent of
cropland by 2080, almost all of it located in the
northern hemisphere. Global food supplies are
expected to be “relatively unaffected” by these
regional shifts, with higher surpluses in much of
the northern hemisphere offsetting deepening
deficits in parts of the south (Parry et al. 1999: S51).
The good news about global warming is that a
northward shift in thermal regimes will open up
large tracts of potentially fertile land in the higher
latitudes that are presently too cold, and have
growing seasons that are too short, for extensive
crop cultivation. Regions that will gain most
additional agricultural land include the Russian
Federation, Central Asia, North America and
northern Europe (see Table 1). A related benefit of
global warming is that crop yields should improve
through “CO2 fertilisation” (enhancedphotosynthesis
due to CO2 enrichment of the atmosphere).
The downside is that global warming could
reduce rainfall and shorten growing seasons in the
tropics and subtropics to less than the minimum
120 days required by most cereal crops. Most of
Africa, especially NorthAfrica and southernAfrica,
will face losses of arable land, increased water stress
and falling cereal yields, intensifying the challenges
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Table 1: Impact of climate change on suitable land for cereals
Reference 1961–1990 Relative to reference
Region (1,000 ha) 1990 2020 2050 2080
North America 358,202 102 110 121 141
Eastern Europe 124,935 103 101 96 96
Northern Europe 45,462 101 109 113 116
Southern Europe 38,524 98 94 94 91
Western Europe 63,267 100 98 98 97
Russian Federation 243,898 105 124 148 164
Central America & Caribbean 51,505 99 105 109 99
South America 653,060 102 104 105 102
Oceania & Polynesia 115,310 102 102 102 88
Eastern Africa 316,282 99 98 100 96
Middle Africa 254,500 102 104 106 102
Northern Africa 11,782 106 97 62 25
Southern Africa 31,316 88 55 48 54
Western Africa 178,095 99 101 100 96
Western Asia 23,561 105 112 94 101
South-East Asia 97,831 100 98 103 104
South Asia 189,132 101 101 99 97
East Asia & Japan 149,694 102 99 108 110
Central Asia 12,908 111 117 147 153
Developed 993,529 102 110 119 128
Developing 1,965,735 101 101 103 100
World 2,959,264 101 104 108 109
Source: Fischer et al. (2002: 64).
they face in meeting their food consumption
requirements through domestic production. Even
with increased fertiliser use, ‘it is highly unlikely
that the demand for cereals can be met’ in these
regions (Döös and Shaw 1999: 281). Although
other regions (such as Oceania and Polynesia and
southern Europe) are also expected to lose arable
land, the food security threat posed by climate
change is greatest for Africa, where agricultural
yields and per capita food production have been
steadily declining, and where population growth
will double the demand for food, water, and
livestock forage in the next 30 years (Davidson et
al. 2003). Projected losses of cereal production
potential in sub-Saharan Africa range from 33 per
cent by 2060 (Norse 1994) to 12 per cent by 2080
(Parry et al. 1999: S64). Certain countries will be
hit more than others.One climate sensitivity analysis
ofAfrican agriculture concludes that three countries
– Chad, Niger and Zambia – will lose ‘practically
their entire farming sector’ by the year 2100
(Mendelsohn et al. 2000: 6).
One source of uncertainty in climate modelling
is the possible interactions between gradual and
abrupt changes, which is important for food security
analysis given the acute sensitivity of agriculture to
perturbations in the weather.Climate change is not
only about global warming; it is also associated with
changes in climate variability (e.g. more erratic
rainfall), and changes in the frequency andmagnitude
of extreme weather events (more droughts or floods)
(Desanker and Justice 2001). Severalmodels forecast
not just higher average temperatures and lower
rainfall in semi-arid regions, but an increasing
probability ofElNiño–SouthernOscillation (ENSO)
events, which have already become ‘more frequent,
persistent and intense since the mid-1970s’ (IPCC
2001: 5). This period has coincided with a lengthy
dry spell in Sahelian Africa, which has experienced
below-average rains since the late 1960s (Nicholson
2001). It is not yet clear whether this is amanifestation
of irreversible climate change, or simply aprotracted
cycle similar to earlier periods of elevated ENSO
activity – such as the last third of the nineteenth
century, when a series of extreme El Niño and La
Niña events (in the1870s,1888–91 and1896–1902)
triggered major famines in China, India, Ethiopia,
Brazil and elsewhere.What is now clear is that ENSO
events havebeen closely correlated with all weather-
related famines in theHorn of Africa for at least the
past 200 years (Davis 2001).
Apart from ENSO events, some climate change
scenarios foresee imperceptible changes
accumulating until thresholds are crossed that cause
entire ecosystems to collapse, putting intolerable
stress on agro-ecologies and the socio-economic
systems that depend on them (Schwartz andRandall
2003). The risk is greatest in areas that are already
environmentally marginal and experience regular
weather shocks – such as the drought-prone Sahel
andHorn ofAfrica.Mutually reinforcing synergies
between slow processes and sudden shocks could
precipitatemuch larger andmore frequent harvest
collapses than local livelihood systems, national
governments and the international humanitarian
system can cope with.
3 How will climate change affect
food security?
Food security is about adequate access to food,
which can be acquired through trade as well as
production – production self-sufficiency is not a
prerequisite for food security, at either the household
or the national level.Most food secure individuals
buy the food they eat instead of growing it, and
even wealthy countries import some basic
consumption commodities. But if the households
and countries that stand to lose food production
due to climate change are also those that depend
most on agriculture and have fewest alternative
sources of income, then falling harvests will certainly
undermine household and national food security.
Many poor countries already experience sizeable
cereal gaps every year and significant proportions
of their populations are undernourished.
Understanding the full range of climate change
impacts on food security therefore requires
understanding the implications for prices, incomes
and trade, as well as on production. For example,
if domestic food production falls, food prices will
rise, undermining access to food by everyone who
depends onmarkets for their consumption needs.
Moving beyond such broad-brush generalities is
more difficult. The impacts of climate change will
be highly differentiated across continents, countries
and livelihood systems, according to local resource
endowments, the nature of agriculture (mechanised
or plough-based, irrigated or rain-fed, commercial
or subsistence-oriented), urbanisation and
economic diversification (agriculture versus
industrial and service sectors), and many other
environmental and socio-economic variables.
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One weakness of many computer models and
scenario forecasts is their failure to factor in
technological change, adaptive behaviour and
political responses to climate change. By isolating
climatic effects andholding all other factors constant,
many of these simulations generate, in effect, worst
case predictions. Recent attempts to integrate the
ecological and economic impacts of climate change
on the world food system combine climate
forecasting with a global general equilibriummodel
called the Basic Linked System (BLS), which
simulates not only climate change impacts on
agriculture but also its knock-on effects on other
economic sectors, and on international trade (Parry
et al. 1999; Fischer et al. 2002). These studies
compare the results of different greenhouse gas
emission scenarios fromGeneralCirculationModels
(GCM)1 against alternative narrative “storylines” for
economic, demographic, social and technological
developments in the twenty-first century.
Early applications of climate change to the BLS
model generated a wide range of projected
outcomes. Chen and Kates (1994) estimated that
the number of undernourished people in 2060
could range from 641 million – the BLS reference
scenario, assuming no climate change – to as many
as 2.1 billion under themost adverse of 12 climate
change scenarios. Applying a more sophisticated
GCM to the BLS model, Parry et al. (1999)
concluded that climate change will place an
additional 80–125million people (±10 million) at
risk of hunger by the 2080s, of whom 70–80 per
cent will be in Africa.
An important initial finding from Fischer et al.
(2002) is that little progress is foreseen in terms of
reducing hunger before 2020 under any of four
possible storylines,2 so targeted programmes will
be needed if theMillenniumDevelopment Goal of
halving hunger by 2015 is to be achieved. Significant
progress is however expected after 2020, in the
absence of climate change, under three storylines
– the exception is storylineA2, which assumes high
population growth and low economic growth – and
by 2080 hunger is substantially less than it is today.
When climate change is introduced to the system,
these positive trends are partly reversed and
estimates of people at risk of hunger increase under
almost all (over 40) simulations. However, the
dominant variable is not climate change, but the
assumed level of economic growth. For instance,
under moderate to high economic growth rates,
the three “optimistic” storylines predict a fall in the
world’s undernourished population, from around
800 million today to between 91 million and 230
million by 2080. Climate change would increase
the risk of hunger by between 5 per cent and 26
per cent, depending on whichGCM and emission
scenarios are simulated, which increases the
projected global hungry population to between 99
million and 290 million; still amajor improvement
on the present.
Only in the “pessimistic” A2 storyline are
absolute numbers of hungry people expected to
increase during the twenty-first century: without
climate change, there would be a slight fall to 768
million by 2080, but climate change adds anything
between 50 and 120 million to this figure, so the
total could be as high as 888 million in 2080. The
authors make no judgement as to which storylines
and scenarios are more or less plausible, but
conclude their analysis with the observation that
climate change will increase the risk of hunger, but
that in aggregate terms continued economic growth
and a transition to stable population levels could
be sufficient to offset this risk: ‘hunger – though
negatively affected by climate change – would
become a much less prevalent phenomenon than
it is today’ (Fischer et al. 2002: 115).
On the other hand, it must be emphasised that
global models generate global outcomes; as a rule,
impacts are not disaggregated below large regional
blocs, and positive trends in some areas can mask
negative trends elsewhere.Most forecasts for Africa,
for instance, are pessimistic about economic growth
prospects for much of the continent, where extreme
weather events regularly inflict heavy losses on
nationalGDP. (See Clay et al. 2003, on the macro-
economic costs of recent droughts and floods in
southern Africa.) Amartya Sen (1986) coined the
phrase “Malthusian optimism”, to describe contexts
where adequate aggregate food supplies conceal
“entitlement failures” and the risk of famine for
certain groups. In the context of climate change, it
is important to note that a favourable outcome at
the global level does not imply favourable outcomes
for all regions and all countries.
A recent simulation for Mali, where average
temperatures are predicted to rise by 1˚C–2.75˚C
by the year 2030, finds that the consequent reduced
precipitation would increase food insecurity by
lowering crop yields for farmers and forage yields
for pastoralists.Cereal harvests would fall by 15–19
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per cent, causing prices to double. The combined
effects of lower production on farming households
andhigher prices on consumers’ access to food raises
the ‘riskof hunger’ in this simulation, from its present
baseline of 34 per cent to 64–70 per cent of the
Malian population by 2030 (Butt et al. 2003: 6).
Unusually, however, theMali study recognises
the dangers of overestimating the impacts of climate
change, by assuming that it occurs with no
adaptation by affected individuals and societies.3
Possible agronomic and policy adaptations inMali
include: switching to heat resistant crop cultivars,
shifting cultivation from semi-arid to temperate
districts, exporting more cotton and importing
more cereals, expanding cropland, andmodifying
land tenure systems.The potential benefits of these
adaptations are enormous: losses due to climate
change are reduced by one-third if some adaptations
are adopted, but if all are adopted the gains more
than offset the losses – cereal production actually
rises, food prices fall, and the incidence of hunger
declines to 21 per cent of the population (Butt et
al. 2003: 15). This finding suggests that present
policies might be generating sub-optimal food
security outcomes – great gains in reducing hunger
could be achieved if these “no-regrets” adaptations
were implemented now, irrespective of future
climate change scenarios.4 But how feasible is it that
countries like Mali – chronically poor, with weak
institutions and weak infrastructure – can
implement the necessary adaptations?
Apart from its impacts on rain-fed agriculture,
climate change will affect water resources,marine
and freshwater ecosystems, forest products and
wildlife, unpredictably and to unquantifiable
extents. People who depend on land, livestock,
forests, rivers and oceans for their living are at
greatest risk of seeing their livelihoods undermined
by more extreme or erratic weather.Unfortunately,
these groups – farmers, pastoralists, fishers, landless
labourers, hunter-gatherers – are already among
the most food insecure in the world. Most
undernourishedAfricans, for instance, live in rural
areas where their livelihoods derive largely from
natural resources and depend critically on
favourable weather.More generally, rural residents
of poor countries have the lowest levels of food
consumption, the highest levels of undernutrition,
and are most exposed and most vulnerable to
weather-related livelihood shocks.
The current Intergovernmental Panel onClimate
Change (IPCC) consensus is that climate change
will raise average global temperatures, and ‘dry
places will get drier while wet places will get wetter’
(Alfsen and Skodvin 1998: 17). Water scarcity
currently affects some 1.7 billion people, and this
number is projected to rise to about 5 billion by
2025.As with the food security impacts of climate
change, “water insecurity” will affect people living
in the subtropics most severely, due tomore erratic
rainfall, more frequent droughts and increased
evaporation. An integrated approach to water
resource management – not just supply-side
measures such as rainwater harvesting, storage
reservoirs and water recycling, but also demand-
side measures such as water use regulation and
pricing policies – will become critical to national
and household food security in water-stressed
regions (Bergkamp et al. 2003).
Climate change is only one of many change
factors that are either apparent or will emerge as
driving forces of global food security in coming
decades, and will interact – positively or negatively
– with each other. Four factors will be briefly
mentioned here. The first is technological change;
notably controversial ongoing advances in
biotechnology that could transform agricultural
practices beyond recognition in the coming decades.
Innovative approaches to crop irrigation offer
another technological response to reduced and
more variable rainfall – only about 2 per cent of
Africa’s arable land is irrigated – but irrigation is
already prohibitively expensive for poor farmers,
and will becomemore costly as water tables fall and
drier conditions increase water requirements for
crops. Clearly, climate change entails economic
losses, and adapting to climate change will incur
economic costs.Are national governments and the
international community willing and able tomake
the necessary investments in irrigation and pro-
poor agricultural technologies?
Second, urbanisation is a process generally
associated with reduced vulnerability to food
insecurity, and rural–urbanmigration is proceeding
with some rapidity. In Africa, where the urban
population rose from 23 per cent in 1980 to 34 per
cent by 1999 (World Bank 2000: 277), climate
change could trigger accelerated urbanisation. But
successful urban-based development (rather than
just an “urbanisation of rural poverty”) is usually
associated with a structural transformation of the
national economy that involves a shift away from
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climate-dependent livelihoods.This transformation
is imperative in food insecure countries dominated
by subsistence-oriented agriculture – all the more
so where climate change superimposes an additional
dimension of vulnerability – but where will viable
alternative livelihoods come from in these countries?
Third, the rise to global prominence of the “war on
terror” since September 2001 is reshaping
geopolitical alliances and interests in fundamental
but still unforeseeable ways, and is illustrative of
how rapidly new change factors can emerge that
transformprevious priorities and public spending
choices.Will climate change generate even a fraction
of this political attention and resource allocation?
Finally, climate change could be “politically
stratifying” at the global level. Losers from climate
change could find themselves increasingly
marginalised and eventually abandoned by
wealthier “winners”, which might abrogate
responsibility for global poverty and withdraw
behind bureaucratic fortresses designed to restrict
in-migration from affected countries. Shortages of
food and water ‘could potentially destabilise the
geo-political environment [and] could contribute
materially to an increasingly disorderly and
potentially violent world’ (Schwartz and Randall
2003: 2; see alsoRogers, this Bulletin).One epicentre
of this instability could be chronically food deficit
and water-stressed regions such as the Sahel and
Horn of Africa, where tensions over access to the
Nile already contribute to the long-running conflict
between north and south Sudan.
4 What can be done?
Although climate change will result inmore extreme
weather events, which are difficult to predict locally
and could result in large-scale ecological shocks
and surprises, it will also cause slower changes to
established weather patterns. In this respect, climate
change offers time and opportunities for mitigation
and adaptation: risk reduction, risk management
and risk coping. In this context, risk reduction is
best achievedby reducing greenhouse gas emissions,
and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol are important
(though imperfect) global policy instruments in
this effort. Risk management includes reducing
exposure to climate change (e.g. diversifying
livelihood systems away from those that depend
directly onnatural resources), or reducing sensitivity
to climate change (e.g. focusing agricultural research
on drought-tolerant crops). Risk coping
mechanisms (such as out-migration of people
displaced by rising sea levels from low-lying areas
of Bangladesh and Egypt) would be adopted once
the worst effects of climate change are apparent,
but would indicate a failure tomitigate these effects.
The people who will be worst affected are
unlikely to be passive victims of climate change.
Most already live in marginal environments and
face weather variability, against which they have
developed livelihood strategies that are resilient
against all but themost severe or protracted shocks
(see the contributions by Leach and Leach and by
Scoones, this Bulletin). Pastoralism, for instance, is
not a lifestyle choice; it is the only livelihood system
that makes survival possible in many arid
environments. Seasonal and long-term migration
are already common responses to food insecurity,
and will certainly be deployed in response to future
climate change. Farm-level adaptations could
include: diversifying towards climatically optimal
crop and livestock varieties, adjusting land use and
cropping patterns, intensifying fertiliser application,
investing in irrigation and improving water
management practices (Mathur et al. 2004).Many
of these adjustments will require pro-active support
by national governments and the international
community – increased public investment in
agricultural research to offset falling crop yields,
incentives and subsidies to promote the adoption
of improved seeds and technologies, provision of
“weather insurance” to poor farmers, and strategic
planning that anticipates the worst consequences
of climate change rather than reactive “disaster
management” after the event (see contributions by
Burton and Yohe and by Hamilton, this Bulletin, on
insurance).
Thus, individual responses are not enough.
Collective action is needed at every level, from
affected communities to institutions of global
governance. Part of the global effort to address
climate changemust be to assist “at risk” groups in
strengthening their coping mechanisms, or better
still, reducing their exposure and sensitivity to
climate change. Assistance provided to some poor
countries under the Global Environment Fund to
developNationalAdaptation Programmes ofAction
is one (limited) step in this direction (Adger et al.
2003), and is discussed inmore detail in this Bulletin
by Huq and Reid and by Greene.
As with all policy arenas, the extent to which
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climate change is taken seriously and effectively
addressed, depends primarily on political will.This
raises the question of “political adaptation” to
climate change. Political responses must be
formulated at national, regional and global levels.
In many poor countries, national capacity to cope
with acute and chronic food insecurity is limited
due to resource constraints, skewed policy priorities
and political unaccountability. Regional solutions
are implausible within Africa, as most of the
continent will be adversely affected by climate
change. So the dependence of low-income countries
on concessionary finance and international
assistance is likely to increase, assuming no positive
movement in economic and demographic trends.
(Higher economic growth rates would reduce
poverty andhunger and increase the import capacity
of food deficit countries, while falling fertility rates
would decelerate the rise in food consumption
requirements.)
At the global level,mobilising forces for action
could include enlightened self-interest (e.g. fears
by wealthier countries of large-scale in-migration
of displaced people from poorer countries), peer
pressure from the international community (such
as a perception that climate change is undermining
agreed targets for global poverty reduction), and
altruism (the humanitarian imperative). As noted
above, the agricultural potential of large surplus
producers like Western Europe, the USA and
Canada is projected to rise thanks to climate change
(though intensifying public pressure to reduce
agricultural subsidies could alter this equation), so
food supplies should be adequate to support
increased demand for food aid.However, whether
the political willingness to transfer food surpluses
to “hungry” populations abroad will continue
indefinitely is yet another unpredictable variable.
5 Conclusion
In terms of food security, climate change is likely
to be globally stratifying, because its worst impacts
will fall disproportionately on those countries,
livelihood systems and “at risk” populations that
are already poor and food insecure, for three reasons.
First, tropical and subtropical countries that are
currently hot, dry and drought-prone will become
hotter, drier andmore drought-prone. Second, the
livelihoods of the poor in these countries are
dominated by farming or pastoralism, and these
sectors will be worst hit by climate change. Third,
limited livelihood diversification at household level,
and a narrow economic base at national level, leave
these families and countries with few options if the
agricultural sector is undermined, so their adaptive
capacity is extremely limited. By contrast, wealthier
countries will lose least from climate change, have
more resources to cope with impacts andmay even
benefit in terms of increased agricultural production
potential.
The linkages from climate change to social
impacts are difficult tomodel, given the central but
unpredictable role of human agency in affecting
outcomes. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the
prevalence and depth of hunger will deteriorate in
those countries and population groups where food
insecurity is already significant. There is a risk that
mutually reinforcing synergies between slow
processes and sudden shocks caused by climate
change, when added to existing vulnerabilities and
institutional weaknesses, could precipitate much
larger and longer term poverty traps than local
livelihood systems, national governments and the
international humanitarian system seem capable
of coping with. To minimise such risks, a range of
mitigation and adaptation strategies can be
implemented at the local and national levels that
will offset some of these anticipated consequences;
many being “no regrets” measures that should be
implemented anyway, if chronic food insecurity is
to be seriously addressed. However, international
action will also be required to support the losers
from climate change, since ‘the people who will be
exposed to the worst of the impacts are the ones
least able to cope with the associated risks’ (Adger
et al. 2003: 180). Because of these differentiated
food security impacts, it follows that climate change
is not just a technical matter; it is a global political
issue requiring global political solutions.
IDS Bulletin 35.3 Climate Change and Development
28
Notes
1. TheGCMs used by Fischer et al. (2002) were developed
by theHadley Centre for Climate Prediction andResearch
(HadCM3); theCommonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisation (CSIRO); the Canadian Centre
for ClimateModelling and Analysis (CCCMA); and the
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR).
2. Storyline A1, for example, anticipates a ‘future world of
very rapid economic growth, low population growth,
and rapid introduction of new and more efficient
technology’, while storyline B2 anticipates a more
heterogeneous world ‘in which the emphasis is on local
solutions to economic, social, and environmental
sustainability’ (Fischer et al. 2002: 34–6).
3. Responses to climate change can take two forms:
mitigation, or reducing the magnitude of climate change
(e.g. by reducing greenhouse gas emissions); and
adaptation, or reducing the negative impacts of climate
change.
4. The phrase “no-regrets” adaptation describes ‘measures
that would be justified even in the absence of climate
change’ (Mathur et al. 2004: 24).
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